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This thesis studies the influence of environmental factors on recruiting Category
I-IIIA males for the United States Army. Econometric modeling using regression
analysis is used to estimate the determinants of the supply of recruits. Four models are
developed from the cross-sectional time-series data and comparisons of the elasticities
of the independent variables are given. The four models are Ordinary Least Squares,
Instrumental Variable Estimation, Instrumental Variable Estimation with AR(1), and
Fixed Effects. Following a discussion on how the data was collected over a four year
period on a monthly basis for each of the Army's fifty-five recruiting battalions (except
Puerto Rico), each model is specified and the possible violations of the basic
assumptions of linear regression discussed. Results of each model are presented and
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2.1 Supply vs Demand 17
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The ability to attract qualified young men into the U.S. Army has been a major
concern of Army manpower officials ever since the abolition of the draft in 1973. The
primary focus in luring young adults into the Army has been through economic
incentives. The Army has joined in competition with private corporations, universities,
farms, small businesses, and industries for these young people. In the past 10 years, the
Army has generally been able to obtain the number of individuals it required, but the
quality of those recruits, as measured by high school completion and aptitude scores,
has varied considerably. In 1979 for example, 16% of the individuals enUsting in the
Army had high school diplomas, while in 1983 the figure was 39% [Ref 1: p. 261].
With the advent of more sophisticated weapon systems and the systems which
support them, a rising proportion of Army occupations require personnel with above
average skills and extensive training. A higher quality enlisted force may also be more
cost effective. A recent study has shown that there is a direct link between aptitude
scores and job performance, as measured by skill tests, scores from training exercises,
and promotion rates [Ref 2]. In addition to being more likely to complete their first
term of service, most Army officers agree on the basis of their experience with troop
units that there are very great advantages to having bright troops.
Experience and research and study efforts have clearly shown that environmental
factors, over which the Army and the Recruiting Command have little or no control,
tend to dominate recruiting performance if timely action is not taken to compensate for
downturns with resources and management initiatives. The single most important
factor is the nation's economy and the closely related civilian employment
opportunities. Also important is the military/ civilian pay comparability. There is
credible evidence indicating that national sentiment toward the miUtary and patriotism
also play a significant role in enlistment decisions.
Since 1980 when the Army recognized the need to improve the quality of its
enlisted population, emphasis has been on recruiting high school diploma graduates
(HSDG) who score in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
Candidates who achieve this type of score are classified as Category I-IIIA (Cat I-
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IIIA). Recruiter experience, numerous studies, and common sense tell us that high
quality recruits have more and better civilian employment and college-level education
options and are therefore more difficult to recruit. As a result, eligibility for incentives
such as the Army College Fund and cash enlistment bonuses have been limited to
HSDG Cat I-IIIA recruits, and recruiter incentives have been established that provide
greater reward for recruiting high quality youth. Research results indicate that
recruitment of HSDG Cat I-IIIA youth takes about four times more recruiter effort
than recruitment of less qualified people [Ref 1: p. 261].
Military' manpower supply under the all-recruited concept depends on the ability
of the military' to compete in the labor market on mostly economic terms in order to
contract people for service in the militar\'. The success of this is determined by
enlistment decisions by individuals qualified for military service (influenced by
enlistment offers and incentives) and the military recruiting system. The effort of this
paper is to identify the factors that affect recruiting through demographic analyses,
analyses of economic factors, and econometric modeling.
The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) faces a tightening budget with
increasing restrictions on bonus incentives offered to first-term enlistees, a shrinking
advertising dollar, an improving economy, and a diminishing youth population. As
these types of restrictions tighten, USAREC's ability to lure high quality {category I-
II lA) male recruits will become more dependent on those factors over which, as stated
earlier, the Army has little control. The econometric model developed in this paper is
an effort to assist the Army in determining better resource allocation, improving
market segmentation,expanding recruiting markets to compensate for the declining
youth market, and making more accurate forecasts of recruiting requirements.
B. BACKGROUND
Recruiting forecasting is done almost exclusively with econometric models, using
various methods of regression analysis where enlistments is used as the dependent
variable and factors that have been found to affect recruiting as independent
(explanatory) variables.
The use of econometric models is well documented over the past decade of All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) research [Ref 3: p. 95]. Beginning with Professor Charles
Brown's modeling effort on the behalf of the Army Research Institute in 1983,
emphasis is being placed on time-series cross section (TSCS) models to assist Army
manpower officials in conducting policy analysis and forecasting the recruiting effort.
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These models can be roughly categorized as those used for resource allocation, which
must include all the relevant resource policy variables, and for reliable forecasting of
the recruit supply. In addition to Brown's model, other widely accepted TSCS models
include Goldberg and Greenston's, and Daula and Smith's.
BrowTi's model analyzes the determinants of the supply of enHstees to the U.S.
Army using quarterly data from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1975 to the third
quarter of fiscal year 1982 for the fifty states and the District of Columbia. In order to
achieve an adequate sample size without including draft-period observations and to
take advantage of large regional differences in the path of unemployment in recent
years, pooled data were used. Brown's main conclusion is that unemployment rates
have quite strong effects on recruitment success. For various categories of high quality
recruits, the elasticity of contracts signed with respect to the unemployment rate ran
from .4 to .8 [Ref 4]. There was also consistent evidence that the number of contracts
was inversely related to civilian wages. The dependent variable in Brown's model is the
ratio of the number of contracts signed by male non-prior service Army enlistees to the
enlistment-age population. Brown used 9 explanatory variables in an effort to specify
the model. These variables attempted to capture the influence of military pay, civilian
wages, unemployment, recruiting resources, and advertising.
LawTence Goldberg and Peter Greenston's TSCS model analyzes the supply of
nonprior service, male, upper mental category enlistments. Pooled data with annual
observations from 1976 to 1983 was used. A clear distinction between this model and
Brown's model is that, in addition to a different time series (annual vs. quarterly), a
different cross section is used. Goldberg and Greenston's use of recruiting districts is an
improvement to the state data used by Brown because recruiting districts overflow state
boundaries and contracts signed are maintained at district level. Goldberg and
Greenston's conclusions are that the determinants of enlistments are quite similar
across the services. High quality enlistments increase with military pay, cyclical
unemployment, regional unemployment, total high school senior and diploma graduate
population, urban mix, and recruiters (per population) and they decline with black
population and the loss of GI Bill benefits. [Ref 3: p. 70]
Daula and Smith's TSCS model is the most sophisticated in its approach to
determining the supply of high quality male recruits. This model distinguishes between
the supply-constrained and the demand-constrained recruiting environments and uses a
switching regression approach to model the problem. Brown and Goldberg's models
12
assumed a supply-constrained environment by using high quality recruits as the
dependent variable. The assumption being made is that one is more likely to run out of
high quality people before running out of slots to place them in. Daula's model tests
this assumption prior to running the appropriate regression. Supply-constrained
observations are used to estimate an enlistment supply function for male high quality
recruits. Demand-constrained observations are used to estimate a separate model of
enlistment production in demand-constrained environments. If demand-constrained
observations were mistakenly used in a supply constrained environment or vice-versa,
the resulting estimate of the elasticity of supply with respect to relative pay would be
biased.
The same argument can be applied to the estimated parameter of the recruit
supply function. Daula and Smith argue that if demand constraints exist, then a
separate model of enlistments in the demand-constrained environment must be
specified. The time series data used is monthly observations on Army recruiting
battalions (cross-sectional units). In an attempt to avoid specification error, 19
explanator\- variables are used to capture the environmental effects on recruiting high
quality males. Daula and Smith's conclusions indicate that enlistments of a group
usually considered to be supply constrained overall may be demand constrained if
enlistment goals are set too low. This finding has several implications for the use of
enlistments models in policy making [Ref 3: p. 118].
C. OBJECTIVE
The effort in this paper is to fuse together the ideas of the previously mentioned
models. A further development of a basic time series cross section model will be
accomplished with new specification of commonly used independent variables and the
inclusion of new explanatory' variables that will eliminate omitted variable bias from
previous work. Although Daula and Smith's model appears to be in the forefront of
econometric modeling with regard to assisting Army manpower planners in policy
formulation and enlistment forecasts, econometric forecasting is far from an exact
science. USAREC currently uses four forecasting models for the purpose of
contemplating the future recruiting needs of the Army [Ref 5]. The current USAREC
philosophy is to approach the recruiting problem from several different angles in order
to place a range on the estimates of the determinants of the available recruit supply as
well as the number of potential recruits expected. It is in this spirit that the model in
this paper is developed.
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A significant goal of this paper is to achieve the estimation of consistent
structural parameters. Given the length of the Department of Defense budgeting
process, shortfalls in recruiting must be identified more than a year before they are
experienced. The requirement for reliable forecasting and accurate resource allocating
is clearly evident.
In review, econometric modeling using mostly regression analysis will be used to
help estimate the determinants of the recruit supply to help Army manpower officials
determine resource allocation. Because of tightening environmental restrictions that
affect recruiting and increasingly limited amounts of funds allocated by Congress to
recruit with, the Army must make every dollar received for recruiting count.
The econometric model presented in this paper is an extension of previous work
by accomplished econometricians. The model's goal is to assist the Army in
determining better resource allocation through the identification of consistent
structural parameters, improve market segmentation through the analysis of the
geographical variation of the determinants of the recruit supply, and develop accurate
forecasting of the supply of recruits through the application of the sound theory and
practice of econometrics,
D. ORGANIZATION
This introduction is followed by four additional chapters. Chapter II details the
data collection techniques and explains what each data set is, how it was collected, and
why it is considered proper for the model. Chapter III specifies the model
development. The functional form of the model and the interpretation of the
coefficients will also be discussed. Chapter IV presents the results of the model to
include its predictive ability, interpretation of geographical variation, and the structural





This chapter details the creation of the dependent variable and the explanatory
variables that make up the database. Plausible explanations will be given to support
the inclusion of these variables into the model. The procedure used to create the
variables for the aggregate data enlistment model will be explained and specific
defmitions of each explanatory variable will be stated.
The enlistment model is estimated with a time-series cross-sectional data set that
includes observations on 55 of the Army's 56 recruiting districts (battalions) by month
from October 1980 to September 1984. This period covers 4 fiscal years and every
recruiting battalion with the exception of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico was not included
because of significant missing data.
The data used in this model was collected from USAREC, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), the Census Bureau, Department of Education (DOE), and the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Each time series (data set or variable) collected was
maintained by one of these sources on a monthly basis. In the cases where the data
were collected by either BLS or DOE the information is gathered and maintained at the
county level. In the cases where the data were collected by either USAREC or DMDC
information is maintained at the recruiting battahon level. In those instances where
county information is used to create a variable, a transformation of the data is
required. County level data were aggregated up to recruiting battahon level because
enlistment statistics (the dependent variable) are maintained at battalion level and most
allocation of resources is done at battahon level. This transformation is straight
forward and vahd because an Army recruiting battahon is made up of counties.
BLS and DOE maintained monthly uiformation on a significant portion of
United States counties. These statistics consisted of economic and demographic
measurements. Counties not individually recorded by these agencies are lumped
together and reported as rest-of-state data. Each state has a rest-of-state category. The
proportion of a county's contribution to the battahon's total figure for each
explanatory variable is determined by the percentage of the battahon's mihtary youth
population (age 17-21) that resides in that county. This percentage is multiplied by the
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existing data point of that county or to the rest-of-state data point if BLS or DOE
does not specify that county. The aggregation of all these counties within the battalion
results in the data point for that particular battalion for any explanatory variable and
any period.
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable in this regression model is the gross number of contracts
signed by male high school seniors and graduates who have scored above average on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). All potential enlistees take the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The scores from four sections of that
test that cover mathematical and verbal skills are combined to form the AFQT.
Individuals with above average scores on the AFQT are in categories I-IIIA. The
number of high quality enlistments is designated as supply constrained because the
Army will take all of this type of individuals it can get. This is a significant requirement
because interpretation of the enhstment supply model with other than supply
constrained observations on the dependent variable will be inconsistent. Any effort to
estimate the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the factors influencing
it will be biased.
The enlistment contract data used to estimate the model come from the Defense
Manpower Data Center. Their series reports the total number of contracts signed while
the Army's records report total contracts signed minus youths who enrolled in the
Army's Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and failed to show-up for induction. Since DEP
loss is a conceptually different problem from enhstment, this study uses gross rather
than net enlistment contracts.
Most studies of enlistments in the all-volunteer force have recognized that the
observed number of enhstments is the minimum of the demand for new recruits and of
their supply. The Army is neither pure price taker nor pure quantity taker. Rather,
they attempt to fill a predetermined wage with recruit quality varying to equate supply
and demand. Thus, the number of high quality enUstees is supply determined, but the
total number of enlistees reflects both supply and demand forces. Figure 2. 1 illustrates
this point. Holding other factors constant, supply is drawn as a function of relative
military compensation. Demand or the enlistment goal is determined by considerations
of force size and structure in the short term. If the relative wage is Wp demand exceeds
supply and actual enlistments will be given by Ej. At W2 miUtary compensation is








Figure 2. 1 Supply vs Demand.
equal E^. This model demonstrates a significant requirement in modeling the recruit
supply. Only supply-constrained observations can be used to estimate enlistment
supply of high-quality recruits. If demand-constrained observations were used, the
resuhing estimate of the elasticity of supply with respect to pay would be biased
downwards. [Ref 1: p. 263]
This study deals with the demand and supply constraints by restricting attention
to specific groups of recruits accepted always by Army manpower officials as being in a
supply-constrained situation. For the Army the always supply-constrained group is
defined as "high-quality" males - high school graduates or seniors who score above
average on the aptitude test administered before enlistment. This group is preferred by
the Army because they are more likely to complete their first enUstment term and
because they are more effective soldiers. In addition to being in higher demand, they




The data used in the specification of the enlistment model can be categorized into
five broad areas: economic factors, sociodemographic factors, recruiting resources,
enlistment policies, and enlistment competition. Each explanatory variable used in the
construction of the enlistment model by association with one of the five above
categories can be determined to be potentially significant in explaining or helping to
describe the propensity of high-quality males to enlist in the U.S. Army.
1. Economic Factors
The most important set of parameters in the model, based on previous
concerns by manpower officials, are those that measure economic factors. The
attention these factors receive from both Army and Congressional manpower experts
reflect important policy decisions and implementations. Previous literature indicates
that military pay and unemployment received the most attention by econometricians
tr>'ing to model the recruit supply [Ref 6]. In analyzing the feasibility of the all-
volunteer Army, the pay elasticity of enlistment was required to determine the
budgetary cost of eliminating the draft. With the implementation of the all-volunteer
Army, attention turned to the unemployment elasticity, because unemployment is the
major uncontrollable factor affecting the proportion of high quality individuals that
will enlist. Other significant economic factors that influence the enlistment decision of
high-quality males is the enlistment bonus offered and civilian earnings opportunities
available to the high-quality male. Bonuses may be thought of as interest free loans
offered to the recruit. In lieu of monthly payments, a period of continuous service to
the Army is expected. The idea of a lump sum of cash can be very appealing to many
high school graduates. Most decisions a qualified youth makes in determining whether
to enlist in the Army or not is weighted against the expected opportunities available in
the civilian market. In essence the Army has to compete with these perceived
opportunities and eventually, service to the nation must be more appealing than
civilian employment in order for the high-quality male to enlist. Military pay, civilian
earnings, unemployment, and enlistment bonuses are the significant economic factors
that influence the number of high-quality males for service in the U.S. Army.
Ideally, an enlistment supply model would include a variable measuring the
value of first-term military compensation compared with the expected civilian
compensation for smarter-than-average male high school graduates. In practice,
enUstment studies using a time series/cross sectional data set have typically included a
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measure of first-term military pay and benefits, an estimate of full-time earnings for
civilian workers, and the unemployment rate. This study follows the same specification.
The military' compensation variable includes base pay, allowances for housing,
and payments for meals (subsistence). Base pay is calculated for a 3-year enlistment,
using the enlisted pay tables for the fiscal years in question and average rates of
promotion through E-4. Allowances for each pay grade are evaluated as the weighted
average of the allowances for single and married soldiers, using the proportions on
enlisted personnel who are single and married within each pay grade as the weights.
Allowances over the first term are then calculated from these averages using the
promotion rates. Subsistence payments are added to the base pay and allowances to
form basic military compensation. The other important component of first-term
militar\' compensation is the enUstment bonus, which is primarily used by the Army to
attract recruits into job occupations that are otherwise unpopular, such as the combat
arms. Because bonuses are occupation specific, it is very difficult to measure their
impact in a model based upon aggregated data. However, to reflect changing levels of
bonuses, the average bonus paid to high-quality individuals has been added into the
the military- pay variable.
Because the cross-sectional unit for this study is the Army recruiting district,
unemployment rates for these areas were constructed from unemployment rates for
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) and states. The unemployment data
come from BLS. For each month an unemployment rate was assigned to every county
in the United States. If the county was in an SMSA, that rate was used. Otherwise, a
rest-of-state average was assigned. Unemployment rates for the recruiting battalions
were formed as the weighted average of the rates for the counties in each battalion,
using the proportion of the male 17-21 year-old population in the counties as the
weights.
In most time series/cross sectional models of enlistment, the major weakness
in the specification of relative pay is the measurement of civilian earnings
opportunities. This study uses the average earnings of production workers in
manufacturing. This differs from the conceptually desired variable in that it averages
earnings of workers of all ages, rather than recent high school graduates, and is
restricted to the manufacturing sector, which accounts for only about 25% of total U.S
employment. A strength of this cross-sectional variable is that it allows for variance of
earnings which do differ geographically.
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The majority of new variables to be examined in this model that have not
been used in previous models are classified as economic factors. Median family income
and the number of people employed by major industry grouping hopefully captures the
economic opportunities and career alternatives available to the qualified youth of a
recruiting battalion. This information, maintained by BLS, and aggregated into a
recruiting battalion average, could provide some dislinking from the sole use of
unemployment rates to measure the susceptibility of youths to economic incentives
provided by the Army.
2. Sociodemographic Factors
A variety of sociodemographic variables have been included in enlistment
models to measure cross-sectional differences in the recruiting environment. The study
and analysis of a battalion's demographics is critical to the allocation of resources.
Previous studies have shown an underlying influence of a battalion's demographics in
determining the supply of high quality recruits with respect to those factors that the
Army has control of Factors in the economic area like military pay and bonuses
offered and implementation of an enlistment policy such as post education benefits if
isolated from demographic considerations will cause a misallocation of resources to
each recruiting battalion. The fact is that the offer of being an infantryman to a typical
high school kid in Eureka, California is not perceived to be the same to the typical kid
from Dayton, Ohio.
Perhaps the most important sociodemographic variable in an enlistment study
with cross-sectional data is a measure of the population of potential high-quality
recruits. That population will vary across recruiting districts both because the districts
include different numbers of male youths and because the proportion of those youths
that are high quality varies. For this study we have constructed a measure of the male
high-quality population using population figures from 1982 and the proportions of that
population that are high school graduates, score above average on the aptitude test,
and are physically qualified, as estimated from the Youth National Longitudinal Survey
(YNLS). In comparison with previous estimates of the potential population of high-
quality recruits, this study uses a more recent source to determine the distribution of
aptitude test scores in each recruiting battalion.
A variety of other sociodemographic variables have been included in
enlistment models to measure cross-sectional differences in the recruiting environment.
Included here are the proportion of the high-quality population that is minority, the
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percentage of the presidential vote in 1980 for the Republican candidate, and quarterly
dummies. Previous cross-sectional studies have usually found a negative coefficient on
the minority variable. Although this may reflect a lower propensity for enlistment
among minority youths, it is caused by unmeasured differences across regions that are
correlated with the racial distribution [Ref 1: p. 268]. The Republican vote variable is
an attempt to measure differences in the strength of conservative or pro-military
opinion. This is an attempt to find if the aversion to miUtary service is on the decline.
A recent survey of attitudes among Army officers and college students indicated that
1974-75 marked the beginning of a shift in American public opinion toward greater
internationalism, support of defense, and concern about the Soviet Union [Ref 7].
Finally dummy variables for fiscal quarters measure the seasonaUty in high-quality
enlistments caused by the school year.
Using county data the total 17-21 -year-old male population was determined
for each recruiting district. This was multiplied by estimates of the proportion of that
population that met the following criteria: were high school graduates or seniors,
scored in mental categories I-IIIA on the AFQT, and reported no health problems that
limited the kind or extent of jobs they could hold. The proportions for each district
were estimated from the YNLS, which administered the AFQT to all respondents in
the sample.
The minority proportion includes Blacks and youths with Hispanic surnames,
and it was estimated for the high-quality population using the YNLS. The Republican
vote in each recruiting district was constructed from SMSA and state data.
An additional sociodemographic variable included in this study that was not
used in the previously mentioned models is the percentage of a recruiting battalion's
population with college degrees. This information was provided by DOE and
aggregated to the recruiting battalion level. This variable may measure future
expectation of the militar>' qualified youth in opposition to career opportunities
provided by military service.
3. Recruiting Resources
The Army directly affects the supply of enlistments through the application of
marketing resources, primarily recruiters and advertising. Recruiters provide
information on the benefits of enlisting. This induces more individuals to consider a
military career and more actually to choose to enlist over civilian alternatives. For this
reason, it is expected that a recruiting district with more recruiters per population will
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have more enlistments [Ref. 8]. Recruiters are analogous to salespeople. The more
people you have on the street talking about the product, the more of the public will
become aware and eventually greater numbers will be induced to join the Army. The
main purposes of advertising are to stimulate goodwill, permit a "slick sales pitch" to
the primary 17-21 year-old age group, and to improve attitudes toward military service
among youth approaching and in the prime enlistable age and among their influencers
[Ref 9]. Advertising and recruiters frequently varied simultaneously and it is difficult
to disentangle the independent effect of each. It is often unclear whether advertising
affects sales or if the level of sales, whether high or low, affects the level of advertising,
as both positions have historically been argued (e.g. "we need more advertising to
maintain high sales" or "in markets with low sales, we need advertising to increase
sales."). To answer questions about the cost effectiveness of both of these resource
instruments - recruiters and advertising - they must be included in the enlistment
supply function.
In terms of budgetary expenditures, the biggest recruiting resource is the
recruiter force. There are approximately 5000 Army recruiters and the marginal cost of
an additional recruiter is estimated to be about S35,000 [Ref 1: p. 303]. To measure
the impact of changes in the size of this force, the model includes the number of
production recruiters assigned to each recruiting battalion, which is the number of
recruiters actually involved in sales activities. Because it takes time for a newly assigned
recruiter to know his territory, a measure of recruiter experience, the percentage of
recruiters in each district with more than nine months there is included.
The effect of national advertising on enlistments, which is considered to be
very important by recruiters, has been difficult to measure with any precision in
enUstment supply models. In this study, national advertising will be measured in terms
of gross impressions, the total number of times that an ad is seen by the target
population. This measure has two conceptual advantages over advertising expenditures,
the measure employed by almost all other studies. Depending on the nature of the
advertising contract, an unusually large or small amount of impressions generated by a
particular advertisement may or may not trigger a change in the cost of that ad. This
means that changes in the amount of advertising delivered are not always reflected in
changes in costs. Second, much of national advertising for recruiting is purchased
through network buys. Although there is a single cost for these purchases, the actual
impact in terms of impressions generated does vary across regions. The gross
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impressions measure reflects network television and radio buys, national magazine
advertisements, and spot advertisements - used to fill in where network coverage of the
target group is not adequate - on radio and television.
The national advertising campaign measures only the Army advertising effort-
the "Be All You Can Be" campaign. An interesting extension to the current
specification included also in this model is the inclusion of impressions generated by
joint service advertisements. Army recruiters argue that advertisements for all services
are less effective in increasing Army enlistments.
There are, of course, other resources used in the recruiting process, such as
cars, office space, and civilian clerical personnel. To the extent that other resources are
allocated according to the number of recruiters, and many are, this estimate of recruiter
effectiveness measures the impact of additional recruiters with their associated
resources. It would, of course, be interesting to include other recruiting resources in an
expanded version of the model. In addition, resources are not the only inputs to
recruiting; students of successful sales operations would identify the quality of
management as an important variable, for example. Because effects like these are
difficult to measure, they have been omitted from this model. As there is no reason to
believe that managerial effectiveness is correlated with the variables included in the
model, this omission should not bias the remaining coefficients. [Ref 1: p. 302]
4. Enlistment Policies
The Army also affects the supply of enlistments through the planning and
implementation of enlistment policies which changes the characteristics of the military
job by other means instead of earnings. The major policy options implemented by the
Army to directly influence the Army's attractiveness to high quality 17-21 year-old
males are the Army's postservice educational benefits program, changes in enlistment
bonus amounts and coverage, and variation in the length of the first-term commitment.
More high school graduates are now weighing post-graduation decisions on long-term
expected gains and benefits instead of immediate future needs. The Army is realizing
that in order to attract the high quality recruit needed to man today's complicated
weapon systems, etc., the future most hold the expectation of improvement as well as
advancement. Today's high school graduate looks not only at what he could be today -
a private in the Army or a short order cook at McDonalds - but what he will also be in
the in three or four years given a decision is made today - a corporal in the Army or an
assistant manager at McDonalds. It is these policy options that the Army implements-
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education benefits, enlistment bonus coverage, and variation in the length of service
required upon enlistment that determine the endpoint of one's service to his country.
Often it is the comparison of endpoints with respect to possible career paths that
determine the job choice of the 17-21 year-old male. It is these policy options that
determine a recruit's decision to enUst in the U.S. Army.
Because it is difficult to quantify changes in the nonpay characteristics of a
military job, it is hard to estimate from historical experience the effects of these
changes on high-quality enUstments. For this reason, recruiting experiments have been
run recently to test variations in the most important of these incentives, postservice
educational benefits and enUstment bonuses. During fiscal year 1981 all the services
participated in a program that systematically varied the kind of education benefits
program that could be offered in different recruiting districts. Starting in fiscal year
1982 there was a similar test, conducted by the Army only, which varied the size of
enlistment bonuses and the length of the enlistment required to receive them. To
measure the net impact of these program variations, dummy variables representing the
treatments in both tests are included in the enlistment supply function.
During the period of 1981-1984 the Army had at various times one of four
post service educational plans in effect. The four plans in effect were the Veterans
Education Assistance Program (VEAP), Super VEAP, the Army College Fund, and the
Mini GI Bill. Their effect on the enlistment supply function is allowed by the use of
dummy variables.
Dummy indicator variables are also use to demonstrate the effect at each
recruiting district during the period of this study. A control program or either a
maximum of S8000 bonus for a four year enlistment or S8000 plus S4000 for a three
year enlistment was used by each recruiting battalion during the period. These bonus
programs alternated between all battaUons.
5. Enlistment Competition
The fifth major category of variable type in the enUstment supply function is
enlistment competition. There are two different kinds of competition in the recruiting
process. The first is the competition between the services for male high-quality
enlistments. There are no published estimates of the impact of other service enUstments
on the Army, but it is commonly acknowledged that the Army is the service of last
resort for high-quaUty individuals [Ref 3: p. 2]. The Air Force and Navy both offer
proportionately more occupational training opportunities than the Army and are
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perceived to provide better living conditions for their enlisted personnel. This, of
course, means that increased enlistments in the other services should reduce enlistment
supply to the Army.
Previous studies have pointed out that there is intra-Army competition for the
recruiter's time and effort [Ref 10]. In addition to enlisting high-quality recruits,
recruiters have an enlistment goal for all other individuals. Because these youths are
demand constrained, meeting this goal is easier than meeting the goal of high-quality
youths, but it is still a time-consuming process. This means, all other things equal, the
more demand-constrained enlistments a recruiter is required to process, the smaller will
be his output of high-quality enlistments.
Given these considerations, the model includes the number of male high-
quality enlistments signed by the other services and the number of demand-constrained
enlistments written for the Army. The data on all the other services contracts signed
were obtained from DMDC. Since none of the four services have exactly the same
boundaries on their recruiting districts, transformation of the data was required to
allow the proper fitting of the data to each Army recruiting battalion. Percentages of
common counties to recruiting battalions were used as the weighted averages to permit
the aggregation of other services contracts into a data point which reflected the
number of other services contracts signed within an Army recruiting battalion.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Although the enlistment decision process is complex, not entirely logically and
rationally explainable, and varies greatly from person to person, the data used to run
the model capture several accepted generalizations. Economic factors tend to dominate,
particularly real and perceived difficulty of finding civilian employment, and real or
expected civilian/military differences in emoluments, such as pay, benefits, and various
enlistment incentives. The national sentiment towards country, patriotism, and military
service is shifting. Service in the Army is gaining increasing acceptance as a feasible
alternative to a civilian job or as a hiatus from additional education. In the last few
years there has been a significant increase in the resources available for Army
recruiting, and greater effectiveness in the use of these resources. Competition among
services for the high-quality male exists. As the size of the potential pool of qualified
youths shrinks into the 1990's, this competition must be addressed by the Army in
order to insure that they attract their fair share of these youths.
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The selection of these variables for the enlistment supply function hopefully
captures a majority of the factors that influences the high-quality male to enlist. By
eliminating omitted variable bias, the enlistment supply function specified by the model
presented in this paper can support the Army in determining the best allocation of




Modeling of the recruiting process is done almost exclusively with econometric
models using various methods of regression analysis where enlistments is used as the
dependent variable and factors that have been found to affect recruiting as independent
variables. The regression equation developed permits forecasting of future recruits. The
coefficients assigned to each independent variable in the equation allows analysis of the
inter-relationships among the variables and each variable's influence on the recruiting
process. The influence of variables on recruiting play a major role in the decisions
made by Army manpower officials in determining budget requests from Congress and
the allocation of resources to recruiting districts. The technique of regression analysis
used in this study will be discussed in this chapter. This chapter will detail the step-by-
step approach used to develop regression models that explain the relationship between
the factors that affect recruiting and the number of high-quality recruits the Army
attracts each month.
While the analysis of the models' results will be discussed in a later chapter, the
specification of each model will be explained here and the results presented. The
specification of the regression model based on the data available for input drives the
step-by-step procedure. An explanation will be given on the validity of the basic
assumptions of the so-called "classical normal linear regression model" as the models in
this study are developed.
Following this brief introduction of the chapter, there will be a section describing
the theory of linear regression. Afterwards, the ordinary least squares model with
logarithmic transformation, the instrumental variable model, the instrumental variable
with autocorrelation model, and the fixed effects model with geographical variation will
be discussed.
B. THE REGRESSION MODEL
Regression analysis attempts to capture the behavior of a random variable (the
dependent variable) through its assumed relationship with one or more additional
random variables (the independent variables). This stochastic relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variables is described in a functional form
known as a regression model:
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Y-= a + pX-+ e^ (eqn3.1)
where Y is the dependent variable, X represents the independent variables, a and P the
unknowTi regression parameters, and c the stochastic disturbance. Observations on Y
and X are observable but those of £ are not. When observations on Y and X are made
over time and geographical areas, as in this study, they are commonly referred to as
"pooled time-series and cross-section data". The model estimates the regression
parameters, a and p, which permits the forecasting of Y given a set of X values and the
analysis of each independent variable's influence on the dependent variable. The
validity of the regression parameters is based on the assumptions of the stochastic
disturbance, e. The dependent variable depends not only on the values of the
independent variables but also on a large number of random causes, which is
aggregated in the form of the stochastic disturbance. Individually these causes are too
insignificant to note, but their collective influence may be quite perceptible. Therefore
the stochastic nature of the regression model implies for a given set of X values there is
a probability distribution of Y values because of the presence of the disturbance value
e. The full specification of the regression model includes not only equation 3.1 but a set
of basic assumptions [Ref 11: p. 208]. These assumptions are:
Normality: Ej is normally distributed.
Zero Mean: E(£^) =
Homoskedasticity: Var(£-) = <T^.
Nonautocorrelation: Cov(£-,£-) =
Nonstochastic X: X is a nonstochastic variable with fixed values in repeated
samples.
In modeling the recruiting phenomena, the classical normal linear regression
model is characterized by the possible violation of two of these assumptions,
homoskedasticity and nonautocorrelation. Awareness of any violation of these
assumptions is critical if one is attempting to accurately portray the relationship among
environmental factors and recruiting. The estimated coefficients developed under the
violation of homoskedasticity and nonautocorrelation will be biased, inconsistent, and
inefficient. Coefficients having these difficiencies will cause misallocation of recruiting
resources and inaccurate forecasts. The ramification of these deeds are clearly evident.
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The estimates of an unknown parameter, in this case, the coefficients of the
explanatory variables, are statistics, random variables whose value can be observed on
the basis of a sample. Since these random variables in the regression model will
measure the influence of the environmental factors on recruiting and thus become
leading indicators for determining effective policy implementation and resource
allocation, it is critical that these estimators possess the properties of unbiasedness,
efficiency, and consistency.
An unbiased estimator is a random variable whose expected value is the
parameter being estimated. If the estimator is unbiased, and repeated samples of size n
were taken, the average of these observed values would be the parameter being
estimated. If an estimator is biased, the actual value of the parameter will be over or
under estimated.
The efficiency of an estimator measures the variance associated with the expected
value of the parameter. An efficient estimator guarantees the minimum variance
possible while inefficiency signals that the minimum variance has not been attained.
Because variance is the average squared distance between a random variable and its
mean, minimizing it permits confidence in the relationship modeled between the
explanatory variables and the dependent variable.
The final critical property an estimator should possess is consistency.
Consistency means that both the variance and bias go to as the number of
observations on the observed values go to infinity. The effort in this study is to achieve
consistent estimators of the actual coefficients in the enlistment supply equation.
C. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
The first model developed in this study is the most frequently used estimating
technique - ordinary least squares (OLS). The least squares principle for choosing the
estimators of the coeffiicients is to minimize the sum of the squared residuals or the
sum of squared deviations of the observed values from their mean. Under the basic
assumptions discussed previously, the estimators obtained in this model are unbiased,
consistent, and effiicient. These properties are critical if anyone uses the model for
policy determination, resource allocation, or forecasting.
The acceptance of the OLS technique in this study is made difficult because of
the nature of the data. Estimation of relationships that combine time series and cross-
sectional data often involves problems \^ith autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
OLS estimators developed under the presence of either of these conditions are unbiased
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but inefTicient. Before anyone totally disregards the OLS technique when attempting to
model pooled data, a substantial amount of econometric modehng in recruiting
continues to use OLS. Goldberg and Greenston's model is developed \\ith OLS
techniques and Brown offers a comparison of the OLS technique with the generalized
least squares (GLS) method BrouTi makes this comment concerning OLS and GLS:
"OLS underestimates the standard errors of coefficients in the presence of serial
correlation, but in these data the standard errors changed little when GLS was
used. GLS also provides smaller true standard errors when the serial correlation
coefficient is known, but this gain does not necessarily occur when the
correlation is estimated." [Ref 4: p. 27]
In most cases the serial correlation coefficient, p, will be estimated. The simple
way of estimating p is to replace the e's in e^ = pe^
.,
+ Ji* by the corresponding least
squares residuals. The least squares estimator of p from e^ = pej._^ + \i^ is given as:
p = _Jflzl— (t=2,3,...,n). (eqn3.2)
[Ref 11: p. 315].
While OLS estimation may be incorrect from a theoretical point of view, it may
offer correct interpretation of variable relationship. The best way to determine if OLS
is correct or not is to do what many researchers do, run several models and compare
the results. This is what this paper does. The hypothesized model using the OLS
technique in this study is:
InY = a + pinX + ^ (eqn 3.3)
where Y is the number of high-quality male recruits, X is the set of explanatory
variables which are assumed to affect recruiting and ]i measures the randomness of Y
caused by the omission of unknown variables that may have an impact on the value of
Y. The estimated coefficients which are to be examined in this study, b, are derived
from the equation:
b = (X'X)-^X'Y (eqn 3.4)
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Natural logarithms were used to eliminate the potential problem of
heteroskedasticity. The logarithmic transformation of the data permits the coefficients
to be interpreted directly as percentage changes in the recruit supply as the
environmental factors vary. A logarithmic transformation is preferable on both Y and
X to linearize the relation and cause the slope of the regression line for the transformed
variables to measure the elasticity of the X variables. The test used for evaluating the
presence of heteroskedasticity in the data is the Breusch Pagan test. Heteroskedasticity
is often present in cross-sectional data and data transformation (use of natural
logarithms) is a common practice used to correct for it. The technique of grouping data
(aggregating county statistics) to form an observation gives further credence to the
suspicion of heteroskedasticity in the data set [Ref 11: p. 368].
Breusch and Pagan test for heteroskedasticity by comparing the value of one half
of the explained sum of squares (Q) to the chi-square statistic (x^) at the .95 level with
2612 degrees of freedom. The claim that the variance among error terms is constant,
i.e., homoskedasticity is present, is valid if Q is less than y}. The value for Q in the
OLS model is 197.68. The "/} is determined by the normal approximation because the
size of the sample 2640 is greater than 30. The x^ ii^ i^he OLS model is 2697. The
results confirm that the transformed data is homoskedastic, or of constant variance.
The results of using ordinary least squares estimation are displayed in Table 1.
D. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION
Like Goldberg and Greenston's and Brown's models, Daula and Smith's research
in recruit modeling with pooled data indicated that the OLS technique did not perform
badly in prediction tests [Ref 1: p. 299]. Their hypothesis for the OLS model's
unexpected performance is that the data included in the OLS model omitted two key
variables which had a counteracting effect- the interservice competition and the
enlistment goal. Those variables, used by Daula, are also included in this study.
If ordinary least squares estimates are applied with the inclusion of these
competition effects in the explanatory variable set, the estimates of the parameters are
subject to bias and inconsistency because the variables used to measure competition
effects may have errors in their measurement. Since these competition effects may
affect Army high-quaUty enUstments, instrumental variable estimation was used to
avoid specifying enlistment functions for all the services. The dependent variable in
this model, the number of CAT I-IIIA males recruited, is predicated on the fact that
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they are supply constrained. In addition to enlisting high-quality recruits, recruiters
have an enlistment goal for all other individuals. While the rest of these recruits are
demand constrained and therefore easier to recruit, they still take-up the recruiters'
time. The more demand constrained enlistments a recruiter is required to process, the
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fewer high-quality enlistments will be obtained. Therefore to measure this competition
effect, the model includes the number o[ male high-quality enlistments written for the
Army.
The significant problem caused by the inclusion of these "competition effects"
variables in the ordinary least squares approach is the measurement error in the
explanatory' variables. These measurement errors in the explanatory variable cause bias
and inconsistency in the estimators. To develop unbiased and consistent estimators
when there are measurement errors in X, additional variables which are related to the
true value of X but not with the errors of measurement are used [Ref 11: p. 216].
These additional variables are called "instruments" because they are instrumental in
letting one obtain consistent unbiased estimators of the regression parameters.
The corrected equation for determining the coefficients of the explanatory
variables when instrumental variables are used to correct for error measurements in X
is:
b = (W'Xr^W'Y (eqn 3.5)
where W represents the matrix of instruments.
Table 2 provides the results of instrumental variable estimation with competition
effects. The explanatory variables in this model which are suspected of having
measurement errors are Army Cat I-IIIA non-high school graduate contracts, all other
Army contracts, and other Department of Defense male high-quality enlistments.
These variables' instruments are the respective enlistment goals for the different Army
contracts and the number of other services' recruiters assigned in each Army recruiting
battalion. The choice of the instruments is determined by its relationship with X and
displays a high correlation with X. The range of their correlation coefficients is from
.71 to .83.
E. AUTOCORRELATION
The models mentioned previously have been corrected for heteroskedasticity (by
log transformation of variables), and possible error measurements in the explanatory
variables (by use of instrumental variables). These basic regression models considered
so far have assumed that the random error terms e^, are uncorrelated random
variables. For time series data the assumption of uncorrelated error terms is often not
appropriate. Much Uke the problems heteroskedasticity can cause when present in
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cross-sectional data, autocorrelation when present in time series data, causes the least
squares regression coefficients to no longer have minimum variance and may be quite
inefficient.
34
Correlated error terms in the explanatory variables is suspect because of the
monthly observations on each independent variable [Ref. II: p. 299]. The assumption
made in this study is that the regression disturbance follows a first-order autoregressive
scheme, abbreviated AR(1). In the presence of AR(I) the basic assumptions that each
error term represents a sampling from a normal distribution is violated. When the
disturbances are first order autoregressive, the error terms are no longer independent
normal but are generated according to the following scheme: £ = p£j._j + \i^. Credence
to the susceptibility of autocorrelation in the model is substantiated by the Durbin
Watson statistic (DW). The Durbin-Watson test measures the serial correlation, p ,
specifically AR(1). in least squares regression. The DW is computed from the vector of
OLS residuals defined as: e = Y - Xb. If the error terms are positively autocorrelated,
p > , the first differences in the error terms will be numerically smaller than the
residuals themselves. The computed DW from the OLS residuals is compared to table
values that have an lower and upper bound based on a 5% significance level, number
of independent variables, and the number of observations. If the computed DW is less
than the lower bound table value, AR(1) is present. If the computed DW is greater
than the upper bound table value, there is no autocorrelation. DW values that fall
between the upper and lower bound table values prove inconclusive. The OLS model
has a DW of .806 while the instrumental variable model has a DW of .912. These
values compare to a lower bound table value of approximately 1.81. A summary' of the




Model DW Value Table Value Conclusion
OLS .806 1.81 p >
INST VAR .912 1.81 p >
OLS FIX 1.46 1.81 p >
INST VAR (ARl) 2.31 1.74 p>0
The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is used to obtain efficient estimates of the
parameters of the enlistment supply function model where the regression disturbances
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display first order serial correlation [Ref. 12]. This method estimates p from the OLS
residuals, transforms the dependent and independent variables so that the residuals
from the transformed equation will be roughly serially correlated, and then runs a
regression using the transformed variables. This process is repeated until p converges or
maximum number of iterations is reached. This technique is used in estimating with a
pooled time series cross section sample by creating artificial gaps so that one region's
variable is not used as a lagged value for the next region [Ref 13].
In constructing the first-order autoregressive instrumental variable model, data
restrictions were imposed by the Time Series Processor (TSP) computer package used
to run the regression. Because of the number of data observations (2640) per variable
there was a ceiling of 22 explanatory variables to be used. The variables included in
this model were those that were found to statistically significant from the instrumental
variable model. Variables are termed statistically significant if their estimated
coefficient value is different from 0. Table 4 presents the results of this model.
F. FIXED EFFECTS
Another model that is commonly used when dealing with pooled cross-section
and time series observation is the fixed effects model [Ref 11: p. 630]. The fixed effects
model allows for variation of the intercept term for each cross-section unit (in this case
a recruiting district) but retains a common vector of slope coefficients for each unit.
This model allows the analyst to examine the influence of the explanatory variables
with each recruiting battalion's own environmental factors removed. In other words,
resource bias, such as larger population, lower unemployment, more recruiters
assigned, etc., is removed from the parameter estimation and a more strict
interpretation of the coefficients is permitted.
The fixed effects model is generally treated within the framework of the classical
linear regression model or OLS [Ref 11: p. 630]. The disturbance, £, is supposed to
satisfy the basic assumptions of the classical normal linear regression model. The
regression equation for the fixed effects model is :
Y = a-Z- + ... Qj^Zj^ + PX + £ (eqn 3.6)
where Z- equals 1 for the ith unit or otherwise.
Table 6 gives the results of the fixed effects model with ordinary least squares
estimation. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.46 suggest that positive autocorrelation is
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Constant -2.18 High Quality Goal .211
(.656) (•019)
Military Pay .282 Income .386
(.063) (.150)
Unemployment .471 Nat'l Adv .051
(.040) (.007)




% Hispanic -.068 % Black -.084
(.011) (.014)
Second Qtr .069 Construction .252
(.017) (.048)
Third Qtr .040 Trans and Util -.268
(.018) (.052)
Fourth Qtr .183 1980 Vote -.039
(.019) (.112)
Army College Fund .202 Government .204
(.028) (.066)








Standard error is in parenthesis.
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TABLE 5
DURBIN WATSON TEST (FIXED EFFECTS)
Region DW Value Table Value Conclusion
Northeast 2.09 1.79 p =
Southeast 2.06 1.79 p =
Southwest 2.02 1.79 p =
Midwest 2.05 1.79 p =
West 2.06 1.79 g =
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present. To correct for this, p was estimated. Because of the memory limitations on
TSP, no Army-wide fixed effects model with AR(1) could be estimated. Five fixed
effect models with AR(1) were estimated, one model for each recruiting region (Tables
7-10). The DW for these models ranged from 2.02 to 2.09. These tests suggest that no
autocorrelation is present and the estimation of the coefficients are unbiased,
consistent, and efficient. These fixed effects model could not be estimated with
instrumental variables in TSP. This required the omission of competition effects from
the model. Using the fixed effects models for analysis one must be aware of potential
omitted variable bias.
Running the fixed effects models at the regional level still offers a valuable
analytical tool for studying the effectiveness of resource allocation. The regional fixed
effects models make comparison with Army-wide models more difficult, but are still
useful in examining the variation of environmental factors caused by geographical
differences.
G. CONCLUSIONS
One of the primary goals of an econometric model is to estimate relationships. In
terms of the recruiting process, these estimated relationships among variables develop
into resource allocations. Adequate support of Army recruiting is essential for
continued success in meeting manpower goals. In order to insure this success, reliable
relationships must be estimated. This chapter discussed the requirements, i.e. the basic
assumptions that must be adhered to, to guarantee parameter coefficients that are
unbiased, consistent, and efficient.
A myriad of models were specified. Each model corrected for a potential violation
of one of the basic assumptions of the linear regression model. The results of these
models are presented here to highlight the variation of estimates one receives when a
model's specification is adjusted. No one, final, appropriate model is offered because
like most of the data (based on economic forecasts) fed into these models, each of
these models is subject to error. By specifying several models, a range of possible
results are presented that allow the officials who allocate resources flexibility in their
planning and issuance of them.
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Maximum 8K Bonus .151
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Maximum 8K Bonus .001
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Maximum 8K Bonus .116
(.070)
















FIXED EFFECTS MODEL MIDWESTERN REGION
Explanatory Estimates Explanatory Estimates
Variables Variables
Military Pay -.016 Control Cell -.049
(.117) (.040)
Unemployment .923 Nat'l Adv .056
(.080) (.012)




Urban Pop -.071 Income .120
(.195) (.547)
Recruiter Exp -.040 % Black -.247
(.053) (.078)




Second Qtr .069 Construction .339
(.042) (.142)
Third Qtr .059 Trans and Util -.283
(.031) (.297)
Fourth Qtr .215 Retail Trade -.768
(.029) (.499)
Army College Fund .158 Finance/Insurance .107
(.042) (.339)
Noncontributory VEAP .026 Services 1.05
(.053) (.394)
Mini Gl BiU .108 Government -.339
(.087) (.173)




Maximum 8K Bonus -.114 High Quality Goal .166
(.050) (.042)





Standard error is in parenth(jsis.
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Maximum 8K Bonus .086
(.072)















IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Effective allocation of resources is accomplished through the analysis of the
elasticities of the environmental factors generated from the use of regression
techniques. The double log form of the models specified in this paper allows the
coefficients of the parameters to be measured in terms of elasticities. [Ref 4: p. 18].
The elasticity of each independent variable (environmental factors) indicates the
percentage change in the mean of the dependent variable (high-quality male recruits)
per unit increase from the mean of the respective independent variable given that all
other independent variables are held constant at their means.
It is appropriate to remember that simple interpretation of the elasticities in the
regression may be misleading [Ref 14|. The problems of muliticoUinearity with some
of the variables makes it impossible to get truely isolated effects of each independent
variable on the dependent variable. Still, it is appropriate to examine the elasticities to
get an indication of each independent variable's influence on the dependent variable. It
is a technique commonly accepted by econometricians modeling the all-volunteer force.
This chapter will examine each envirormiental factor's impact on the recruiting
process. Identification of the most influential environmental factors is critical to the
goal of effective resource allocation and cost effectiveness of recruiting programs. The
influence of a variable will be measured by its elasticity and its level of significance to
the model as defmed by its standard error term. By specific identification of those
influential variables which the Army has control of, the Army can tailor them in such a
way to insure that the high-quality male goal is met. By identifying those factors which
the Army has no control of, probable future states of the high-quality male recruit
supply pool can be anticipated.
In this chapter, the elasticities of the independent variables will be analyzed
through their comparison from different model specifications. It will be noted when
there is a significant difference among the models' results with respect to an
environmental factor's elasticity. The specific models are OLS, Instrumental Variable,
Instrumental Variable with AR(1), and OLS with Fixed Effects. Discrepancies will be
discussed and plausible explanations for their causes will be stated. An examination of
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geographical variations will be conducted and the most significant environmental
factors on a regional basis will be presented. Finally through the application of the
Chow test, analysis of parametric consistency will be discussed.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
The elasticities of the economic factors were estimated from all four enlistment
supply models. Small variances between the models in the elasticities of most of these
variables were discovered with the inclusion of the competition effects variables in the
models' specification. Sign consistency of the elasticities was present. The most
significant economic factors were relative military pay and unemployment. Other
significant determinants of the recruit supply were the number of employees in
construction, transportation/public utilities, and government.
1. Relative Military Pay
The relative military pay variable was statistically significant in every model. A
1% increase in the relative military pay would cause the supply of high-quality male
recruits to increase an>'where from .49% to .28% based on the model used. The
coefTicient of this variable decreased as the specification of the regression model
became more sophisticated. The influence of the pay variable decreased when the
competition effects were added. The value of this variable is about half of the lowest
value of the earher models mentioned. It is an illustration of the impact of omitting
significant variables from the model. The expansion of the independent variable set
caused an erosion of the importance of relative pay as some emphasis was shifted to
family income and job market. This is consistent with congressional sources who have
for the last several years restricted the increase or frozen E-1 pay in relation to all
other pay increases given to all other ranks. The thought behind the freeze is that E-1
pay is not the primary cause in motivating high-quality males to enlist.
2. Unemployment
The estimated unemployment elasticity has a very strong effect on enlistment
supply in every model. A decline of 1% in the unemployment rate causes a reduction
of approximately .5% in the high-quality recruit supply. This unemployment finding
highlights what Army manpower officials have long realized—the quality composition
of entering recruits depends on the business cycle [Ref 1: p. 281]. When
unemployment is low, the Army falls short of the high-quality recruits and must make
up this shortage by enlisting other than I-IIIA recruits. Because of no lateral entry into
the upper enlisted rank, a below-average enlistment group makes for a below-average
noncommissioned officer group a few years later.
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3. Median Income
The median family income remained statistically significant throughout each
model but its coefficient dropped from .826 to .386 as the model became more
sophisticated. Interpretation of this parameter must be carefully scrutinized. If
recruiting officials were to target high income neighborhoods for recruiting they would
likely fail as much as if they had targeted low income neighborhoods for recruiting. The
positive correlation between high-quality recruits and income is most Ukely a function
of the supply pool increasing as the median income increases. At the recruiting
battalion level, a composite of maybe sixty counties, the income variable is probably a
good indicator of the number of qualified males in the area.
4. Job Market
A feature of this study, not used in any other known model, is the inclusion of
specific job availability as defmed by major industry grouping. Of the seven industries
used as variables in the models, only construction, transportation/public utilities, and
government were found to be consistently significant in the models. Of these three,
only transportation/public utilities was found to have a negative influence on the high-
quality recruit supply. It has the most negative influence (-.632 to -.268) of any
variable in the model. Construction and goverimient jobs had similar positive
elasticities on the recruit supply. It was believed that job increases in the service sector
would have a significant impact on recruiting but that is not the case at the high-
quality level. An analysis of the job market indicates that there is more demand in the
transportation/pubhc utilities sector than any other sector for the type of individual
that the Army is attempting to recruit.
C. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
The elasticities of the sociodemograhic factors were estimated from all four
enhstment models. The most significant sociodemographic variables found in common
by these models were the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics in the general population,
seasonal dummies, and urban population density. MulticoUinearity was suspected of
causing problems with a couple of the factors based on the mixed results obtained.
1. Qualified Military Available
Mixed results were noted from the qualified military available (QMA) variable.
The expected results that high-quality enhstments increase with the size of the potential
pool were not evident. The estimates on the QMA variable from the models specified
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reflect a potential problem with multicollinearity. The fluctuation in the variable's
statistical significance - significant in the OLS model but insignificant in the other
models - and its changes in sign indicate the existence of multicollinearity. Because of
the multicollinearity problem, the QMA variable does not reflect any inherent eflect on
high-quality enlistments but only a partial effect. An examination of the QMA
variable's correlation with all other independent variables failed to identify the source
of the co-linear problem. The correlation coefficient never exceeded .70. Most likely,
QMA is a complicated function of several other independent variables.
2. Quarterly Dummies
The quarterly dummy variable confirmed the expectation that people are more
likely to enlist in the summer period, July to September, than any other time of the
year. This statistically significant variable indicates that after the fourth quarter of the
fiscal year, the April to June period is the second most likely period for high-quality
enlistments. The least likely time for enlistments is the first quarter, October to
December period. These results are consistent with recruiters' observations that most
seniors and high school graduates make their enUstment decision shortly after
graduation [Ref 1: p. 283].
3. Minorities
In all the estimates dealing with the principal minorities, Blacks and Hispanics,
it was determined that areas with proportionately more minority youths in the
population produced fewer high-quality enlistments. The negative eflect for Blacks was
found to be greater. For every 1% increase in the Black population, the percentage of
high-quality enlistments dropped in a range from .078 to .183. The same percentage
increase in the Hispanic population caused a drop from .068 to .109 in the high-quality
enlistment rate.
4. College Degrees
The elasticities associated with the percentage of a recruiting battalion's
population with college degrees showed a negative correlation with high-quality
enlistments. This variable lost its significance when the instrumental variable AR(1)
model was run. Again, the condition of multicollinearity is suspect but examination of
the college degree variable's correlation with all the other independent variables fail to
clearly identify a source. Although it is fair to assume that people with college degrees
are highly unlikely to enlist, inference of a population susceptibility to enlistment given




The results of the enlistment supply models in this study indicate that high-
quality enlistment supply is greater in urban areas. A 1% increase in the urban
population increases enlistments from .021% to .053%. The lack of significance in the
elasticities of this variable is probably a reflection of the domination of the number of
recruiters assigned to a battalion. A hkely determinant in recruiter assignment is the
population density. The urban area population is important in the enhstment supply
function but it indirectly contributes to the high-quality enlistment model through its
use by manpower officials in determining the number of recruiters assigned to a
battaUon.
6. Republican Vote
The Republican vote variable failed to measure suspected differences in
conservative or promilitary opinions across regions. The lack of a consistent positive
sign in the vote elasticity might suggest that the enlistment decision isn't a clear
indicator of a conservative viewpoint on part of the enlistee or the region he comes
from. More likely, stronger incentives (economic, social, etc.) determine the likelihood
of enlistment.
D. RECRUITING RESOURCES
A correct specification of the enlistment supply model is critical for proper
interpretation of the recruiting resources' elasticities. The technique of allocation of
recruiting resources across recruiting districts may cause them to be lagged endogenous
variables [Ref 1: p. 282]. In order to properly measure their effectiveness in
determining enlistment supply, only the results from the fixed effects model applies.
The most significant variables in determining enhstment supply are the number of
recruiters assigned and national advertising impressions,
1. Recruiters Assigned
The elasticity of recruiters assigned dropped from a high of .556 to .150 with
the introduction of the fixed effects model. This variable maintained a statistically
significant positive correlation with high-quality enlistment. For every 1% increase in
recruiters added to a recruiting district the number of high-quality enhstments increased
by a minimum of .15%.
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2. Recruiter Experience
There was no significant relationship between the number of recruiters with
more than nine months recruiting service and the number of high-quality enhstments.
Eagerness of newly assigned recruiters to do well may have offset any advantage
experienced recruiters may have had. An interesting study might be an examination to
see if the most qualified recruiters (based on enhstment evaluation report scores) have
a significant impact on recruiting.
3. National Advertising Impressions
The estimated effectiveness of national advertising remained fairly constant in
all four models. Although the variable was statistically significant, its impact is
considerably less than most of the other variables. In the fixed effects model, a 1%
increase in advertising reflected in only a .054% increase in enhstments. Previous
studies of Army advertising effects have obtained widely divergent results [Ref 1: p.
287]. Brown found a statistically significant, negative impact on national advertising
expenditures on high-quahty enhstments [Ref 4: p. 32]. iMost if not all manpower
officials would agree that advertising is important for enhstment. The problem is in
measuring how advertising affects the 17-21 year-old group. Results on this variable
will probably remain divergent until a more accurate technique is used to determine
advertising influence.
4. Local Advertising Expenditures
In the fixed effects model, local advertising had a statistically significant
negative impact on enhstment. A 1% increase in advertising dollars caused a ,017%
decrease in high-quality enhstments. The ways in which local advertising dollars are
spent are at the discretion of the local battahon commanders. The underlying
conclusion of this variable's elasticity is that most recruiting commanders do not spend
their dollars effectively.
E. ENLISTMENT POLICIES
The elasticities of Army enhstment pohcies, postservice education benefits, and
enlistment bonuses offered were estimated in ah four models. Dummy variables were
used to analyze the effectiveness of these pohcies with one another. The Army College
Fund and large bonuses for 3 -year enhstments clearly proved to be the most effective.
Recruiting goals' elasticities were examined to check if the appropriate quotas for high-
quahty enhstments were correctly specified to uisure that the enhstments remained
supply-constrained.
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1. Postservice Education Benefits
The results from this variable highlight the importance of postservice
education benefits in recruiting high-quality youth. During the fiscal year 1981
education benefits test, Army recruiting districts offered four different packages, a
volunteer educational assistance program with additional government contribution
(SuperVEAP), a VEAP program with further enhanced benefits (Army College Fund),
a VEAP program without the contributions required of participants in the basic
program (noncontributory VEAP), and a less generous version of the GI Bill (mini-GI
Bill). A set of dummy variables was included in the enlistment models to represent
these variations in education benefits.
Compared with the SuperVEAP, which is the base group in the models, the
Army College Fund is estimated to increase the supply of high-quality enlistments by a
minimum of 20%. The other postservice education benefits were undistinguishable in
comparison with SuperVEAP. Clearly, the Army College Fund is the most attractive
education benefits program the Army can offer to high-quality males.
2. Enlistment Bonuses
There were three treatments in the Enhstment Bonus Test. The first was a
control cell where the existing schedule of enhstment bonuses - from SI 500 to S5000
depending on the military occupation chosen - was offered. The second treatment
raised the bonus amounts so that they varied from S2500 to S8000. The final cell
offered the higher schedule and S4000 bonuses for 3-year enhstments. In all the other
cells, bonuses were only available for individuals enlisting for 4 years.
There was no substantial effect on enhstment supply when 4-year bonuses
were raised, but when the 3-year bonus is offered there is an increase in high-quahty
enlistments. An elasticity of .049 on the 3-year bonus indicates a positive significant
relationship with enhsting. For high-quahty males whom have the goal of attending
college, 3 years would appear to be the limit at which they would wait to enter.
3. High-Quality Goal
The recruiting goal has a positive significant impact on enlistment. The
positive coefFicient assigned to this variable indicates proper determination of quotas
set. Negative elasticities would reflect too low of a threshold implying that some high-
quality enhstments were demand-constrained instead of supply-constrained. Only
supply-constrained observations can be used to estimate enhstment supply of high-
quality recruits. If demand-constrained observations were used, the resulting estimate
of the elasticity with respect to the independent variables would be biased downwards.
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F. COMPETITION EFFECTS
Competition effects were measured only in the instrumental variable models
because the inclusion of them in the other models would cause biased coefficients. The
results show that there is competition for a recruiter's time and effort and that the
Army is the last choice of most high-quality males.
1. Other DOD I-IIIA
The number of high-quality recruits enlisted by the other armed services has a
statistically significant, negative impact on the Army's ability to attract high-quality
recruits. An elasticity of -.044 reflects the Army's disadvantage in recruiting high-
quality males. The elasticities in the instrumental variable models indicate a drop in the
Army enlistment supply for every time additional youths are recruited by the other
services.
2. Other Army Recruits
The estimates of the influence of other Army recruits - other than I-IIIA
males - reflect no negative impact on high-quality recruiting. This positive correlation
suggests that when the Army recruits, it recruits in all categories. There is also a
chance that in order to insure quotas are met, recruiters delay signing some individuals
for a later month when the available supply is lower than anticipated.
G. GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATION
A difficult task for manpower officials is allocating recruiting resources on a
regional basis based on analysis conducted at the national level. Some pragmatists
argue that regional analysis is required for cost effective resource allocation. The
influence of the environmental factors that affect high-quality enlistments differ from
region to region. These differences highUght the importance of determining specific
resources at the regional level instead of a nation-wide issuance of similiar resources to
each region.
Because of politics and national interest, not all resources can be parceled out on
a regional level. It would be foolish of the Army to offer higher enlistment bonuses in
the Southeast than in the Southwest. It would not be pragmatic, for example, for the
Army not to actively recruit in Maine because it is not cost effective. Besides the
Maine congressional delegation protesting such a policy, the Army prides itself in being
the ground fighting force for all the United States.
While resources like postservice education benefits, enlistment bonuses, and, to
some extent, recruiter assignments are immune to geographic variation in determining
52
resource allocation, many other resources can efTectively, through careful
dissemination, improve the Army's ability to enlist large number of high-quality males.
It is useful to get a feel for the extent of regional variation in the most important of
these environmental factors that characterize local labor market conditions and
regional demographics and have a significant influence on the allocation of resources.
Regional averages of civilian earnings, unemployment, urban population, percentage of
population with college degrees, and median family income are presented in Appendix
C.
During the 1981-1984 period unemployment was highest in the Midwest and
lowest in the Southwest. The other three regions were within one percentage point of
each other. Civilian earnings showed substantial variance during this period.
Production workers in the Southeast earned over SlOO less a week than their
counterparts in the Midwest, who had the highest average earnings. This pattern
remains the same for median family income. The Southeast is the least urbanized
region and the West is the most educated.
In the remainder of this section, analysis of each region's fixed effects model will
be conducted with interpretation of the elasticities of key environmental factors
peculiar to the region that impact on the enUstment supply. How these elasticities
could be used in allocating recruiting resources is discussed.
1. Northeast
Similiar to all other regions, the unemployment rate is the most critical
determinant of the recruit supply. Relative military pay, recruiters assigned, and the
urbanization percentage were the other significant environmental factors that showed a
positive impact with enlistment. Minorities had significant negative influences. Job
market segmentation in the Notheast was evenly split with the number of people
employed in the service sector having the most positive influence and the number of
people employed in retail trade having the most negative influence.
Based on the elasticities computed in the Northeast model, recruiters should
target the suburbs for enlistments. The positive urban coeflicient and negative minority
coefficients clearly indicate that. The urban elasticity indicates that the enlistments
come from built-up areas but the negative elasticity associated with Blacks and
Hispanics, who predominately live in the inner cities, reflect little success in recruiting
there. The positive Republican vote (large percentage is white) gives another indication
of this relationship because most major northeastern cities are Democratic while the
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suburbs are mostly Republican. The negative local advertising coefTicient means an
advertising pitch in the inner cities is not drawing qualified Blacks and Hispanics into
the service.
2. Southeast
The Southeast model offers several conflicting points. While the relative pay
coefficient, .241, is positive, it is lower than either the Northeast or Southwest where
civilian earnings are higher. Because Southeastern workers earn the lowest pay,
intuitively you would expect that the relative military pay variable would have the most
significant positive impact of these three regions, which it does not. Perhaps specifying
production workers' earnings for pay comparison is inappropriate.
The only region where the black population elasticity, 1.44, has a positive
impact on recruiting is in the Southeast. Perhaps Blacks perceive the Army as a better
opportunity for advancement than what civilian employment offers in the South. The
use of more black recruiters in the Southeast may let the Army take advantage of this
situation.
Strangely, the number of recruiters assigned did not have a significant impact
on recruiting but advertising did. In the Southeast, the electronic and print media can
effectively do much of what other recruiters do around the country. It is interesting to
examine what these results imply about cost effectiveness of advertising and recruiters.
Using fiscal year 1983 dollars, a 1% increase in the recruiter force would cost about
SI. 75 million, while a 1% increase in all advertising would increase recruiting costs by
approximately S400,000 [Ref 1: p. 287]. In the Southeast, by supplanting some
recruiters with more advertising, more high-quality enlistments can be obtained at a
lower cost.
3. Southwest
The critical environmental factors in the Southwest that positively influence
enlistments are relative military pay, unemployment, assigned recruiters, and urban
population percentage. The minorities have a negative influence on enlistments. Within
the Southwestern job market, the strongest positive correlation with attracting high-
quality males is employment in the service sector while government employment
(excluding military) has the strongest negative correlation
The strongest among all the regions, the urban population percentage
coefficient, .410, reveals that most high-quality enlistments come from cities. Because
of the great distances recruiters would have to travel to cover a entire recruiting
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district, it is not surprising that they would primarily focus their efforts to recruit in the
city. The strong positive elasticity associated with employment in the service sector
suggests the Army is viewed quite favorably when compared to the service industry. In
the Southwest at least, the Army is defeating McDonalds in competition for the high-
quality male.
In this region, there is no obvious policy alteration plan required to increase
the number of enlistments. With the exception of increasing military pay (which always
raises enlistment) there is no cost effective alternative. Most of the influential factors
here are not controlled by the Army. With the use of accurate economic forecasts in
this region, the Army might be able to anticipate windfalls or shortfalls in the recruit
supply and adjust accordingly.
4. Midwest
Unemployment dominated the Army's influence in recruiting high-quality
enlistments in the Midwest during 1981-1984. In fact, during this period, the Midwest
replaced the Southeast as the dominant per capita supplier of recruits to the Army
[Ref 4: p. 17]. The unemployment elasticity, .923, was so influential in determining
enlistments that the relative pay variable was found to be statistically insignificant. The
loss of jobs in the Midwest is reflected in the negative elasticities associated with
employment in transportation/public utilities, retail trade, and manufacturing. As the
number of employed shrunk in these industries, Army enlistments rose.
From analysis of the 1981-1984 period, the Army's ability to recruit high-
quality males in the Midwest goes as the economy goes. This traditional view is the
most valid in the Midwest. With an upswing in the economy, manpower officials will
have to look for other ways to entice qualified men into the service. The high elasticity
of recruiters assigned, .589, is due to the artificially high number of enlistments caused
mostly by unemployment. Only in the Midwest did all the postservice education
benefits show positive influence. This might relate to the Midwest having the second
lowest percentage of college degrees in the nation. Affordability of college is more
difficult here than in most other regions. Promotion by recruiters and advertising of
college money earned while serving in the Army may be the most effective avenue
Army recruiters can take to maintain enUstments in the Midwest.
5. West
In accordance with the elasticities generated for the environmental factors in
the West, the Army has a difficult goal to attain. The only clear opportunity to enlist
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high-quality males in the West is during a sluggish economy. The second highest
unemployment elasticity, .887, is in the West. Four out of the seven industries show a
negative relationship with enlistment. The loss of jobs in transportation/public utilities,
real estate, government, and manufacturing will increase high-quality enlistments. An
elasticity of .128 makes the relative pay less effective than in all but one of the other
regions. The most positive discovery in the West is a remarkably high positive elasticity
for Hispanics, .556.
Like the Midwest, the fixed effects model for the West supports the traditional
outlook on recruiting - recruiting goes the opposite of the economy. Both local and
national advertising have positive impacts on recruiting as did the Army College Fund.
To offset the growth in the economy, additional funds in advertising and postservice
education benefits are needed in the West to recruit qualified males.
H. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
The final analysis of the regression coefficients is a test for structural change or
stability of the elasticities. Stability can be important if the model's results are to be
used for long range forecasting. The parameters in this study are suspected of
instability primarily because of the time period in which the data was collected. During
the time period 1981-1984, two major events that could affect enlistments occured.
First, the end of an economic recession in January 1982 could cause instability the
economic-related factors instability. Second, in June 1983 a new USAREC commander
was appointed whose different leadership qualities and management style imposed
higher motivation in Army recruiters.
TABLE 12
CHOW TEST
Breakpoint Computed F F(kn + m-2k) Results
January 82 9.12 1.60 Reject H^
June 83 7.53 1.60 Reject Hq
Chow tests are a special form of F-tests in which the stability of the regression
coefficients over two subperiods of the data set are tested. The Chow tests preformed
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in this study are summarized in Table 12. This is normally done by running the same
regression for the whole period, then running the same regression for the two
subperiods, and comparing the sums of squared residuals (SSR). The breakpoint for
the subperiods is a subjective determination on part of the researcher. We have already
discussed the probable breakpoints for this model. An F-test for the constraint that the
two sets of coefficients are equal (i.e., stable) can be computed from the SSR as
follows: [Ref 13: p. 83]
(SSR^n - SSR,- SSR^Vk
— ^ F^kn + n. 9k^ (eqn4.1)(SSR^ +.SSR2)(n + m-2k) (k,n + m-2 ) vh
Here k represents the number of restricted coefficients, n the number of observations in
the first period, and m the number of observations in the second period. The null
hypothesis, H^, tests to see if the coefficients are equal. The computed F above is
compared to the f^(kn + m-2k) statistic. If the computed tabled F is less than
^(k n + m-2k)' '^C'^^P^ ^o ^^^^ ^^^ coefficients are stable.
From analysis using the most sophisticated model in the study. Instrumental
Variable with AR(1), instability for each breakpoint was determined. In general, the
larger the sample size, the more likely we are to reject the null hypothesis as stated
[Ref. 11: p. 422]. To overcome this difficulty, Kmenta suggests to change the level of
significance with sample size. In particular, the null hypothesis, Hq, that the
coefficients are stable, is accepted if:
n-k
F < (n^/^ - 1). (eqn 4.2)
where F is the calculated value of the F statistics, r is the number of restrictions, and
(n-k) is the number of degrees of freedom corresponding to the unrestricted error sum
of squares [Ref 11: p. 422].
Using this method to allow for correction of sample size bias, the null hypothesis
of coefficient stability is accepted (See Table 13). This result permits the use of this
model for long range forecasting which is critical in the budgetary process. The
recruiting budget is submitted two years prior to the year of implementation which
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TABLE 13
KMENTA SAMPLE SIZE CORRECTION
Computed F F/^q 2580) Results
8.14 1.60 Accept Hq
requires an accurate assessment of how environmental factors influence recruiting over
time.
L CONCLUSIONS
The four models specified in this study provided consistent elasticities for many
environmental factors suspected of influencing recruiting. Relative pay,
unemployment, advertising, urban population, median income, minorities, quarterly
dummies, and employment in transportation/public utilities were the most significant
factors affecting enlistment.
By running the fixed effects models at regional level differences were noted in
several environmental factors. With this knowledge, manpower officials can target
regions with different mixes of resources to insure high-quality enlistments.
Coefficient stability was determined in the study. Stable structure of the
coefficients permits long range forecasting of the effects of the environmental factors in
enlistments which are critical to the budgetary process.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ability to enlist qualified young men into the Army is critical to the
maintenance of peace by the United States in today's world. With the advent of
sophisticated and lethal weapon systems, the challenge to operate and maintain them
exceeds the mental capacity of many young adults. The Army has identified, through a
series of tests, that individuals categorized as I-IIIA's are capable of meeting the
challenges of today's technology. In order to recruit these quahfied young men, the
Army must determine what environmental factors influence enlistment and seek to
manipulate them to insure a proper flow of high-quality recruits into the service. In
addition to insurance of quantities of skilled recruits, the Army seeks to become more
cost effective in recruiting to offset potential cutbacks in the recruiting budget.
The objective in this study was to determine which environmental factors
influence recruiting. Identification of these factors wiU allow the determination of the
best mix of resources to meet the Army's recruiting mission, provide warnings of
downturns in recruiting potential and identify effective compensatory programs.
Econometric modeling using regression analysis was used to estimate the determinants
of supply.
Previous work done by other econometricans was mentioned and ideas borrowed.
The uniqueness of this study is the effort made to further explain the relationship of
the nation's economy to recruiting through an expansion of the explanatory variable
set highlighted by the inclusion of specific employment opportunities available in the
civilian sector. Hopefully, model specification error was reduced because of the
inclusion of these variables.
Four models were estimated. The question of which model. Ordinary Least
Squares, Instrumental Variable Estimation, Instrumental Variable Estimation with
AR(I), or Fixed Effects, is best, is not appropriate. The fact that a set of supply
determinants, given by each model, are different indicates the degree of risk. The more
the models agree, the lower the risk. On the other hand, the more the models disagree,
higher the risk and the possible need of policy change to reduce it.
Each model has its own capabilities, disadvantages, and uses. Each model was
designed under different assumptions of the pooled data which included forty-eight
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monthly observations per variable for fifty-five recruiting battalions. Consideration of
heteoskedasticity, autocorrelation, measurement errors in the independent variable,
covariance, and coefficient stability was addressed.
The results of this study showed that, in general, the environmental factors that
positively influenced high-quality enlistments were: relative military pay,
unemployment, recruiters assigned, advertising, the Army College Fund, and median
income. In general, the most significant environmental factors that adversly affect
recruiting were: the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics in the population, college
degrees, implementation of the Noncontributory VEAP Program, and high-quality
enlistments by the other services.
Inclusion of the job sector employment variables provided limited additional
information. The only industry to have a consistent influence on enlistment was the
transportation/public utilities sector which demonstrated an adverse effect on
recruiting.
Finally, limitations on even the most sophisticated models specified in this study
must be recognized. Such models, based on past data, generally are excellent for
describing the past and also the near future if environmental factors remain stable. In
economics the past does not necessarily accurately foreshadow the future. This point is
critical when one realizes that these enlistment models (like all others) are developed
largely on economic data. Further, an econometric model cannot predict such
important incommensurables as the politics of Congress or changes in the attitudes of


































































MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA SET
Variable Mean
Civilian Pay (per week) 345.0
Advertising Impressions (OOO's) 1301.0
QMA % of Population 70.6
Black % of Population 11.1




Local Advertising Expenditures (OO's) 64.3
Republican Vote % 51.9
College Degrees % 15.9
Median Income (OOO's) 16.9
Urban % of Population 70.7
Employees in Construction (OOO's) , 79.1
Employees in Trans/PU (OOO's) 97.9
Employees in Retail (OOO's) 386.5
Employees in Finance (OOO's) 104.1
Employees in Services (OOO's) 355.1
Employees in Government (OOO's) 103.8
Employees in Manufacturing (OOO's) 356.1
High Quality Goal 71.9
DOD I-IIIA Recruits 179.0
Other Army Recruits 127.6




Variable Northeast Southeast Southwest Midwest West
Earnings 331 290 336 395 368
College % 17.5 13.2 15.7 14.6 18.9
Income (OOO's) 17.7 14.7 15.8 18.1 17.8
Urban % 74.6 59.2 70.8 69.3 81.6
Unemployment 7.9 8.7 7.5 9.9 8.7
Black % 9.7 18.4 13.8 8.4 4.3
Hispanic % 4.2 7.3 12.4 1.8 11.2
Enlistees 80.3 75.6 56.9 98.9 73.1
QMA (OOO's) 83.2 43.9 66.9 81.9 74.2
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